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ZYGOTE ZEITGEIST: LEGAL COMPLEXITIES
IN THE EXPANDING PRACTICE OF
EMBRYO DONATION
Noah Geldberg*
In recent decades, individuals and couples facing the
issue of infertility have been able to achieve parenthood
through advances in assisted reproductive technology
(ART), such as embryo donation. This Article evaluates the
current law governing embryo donation, considers the
different approaches courts and legislatures have taken to
regulate embryo donation, and advocates for an approach
that best balances the policy arguments underlying those
approaches. Ultimately, this Article argues that contract
law, rather than laws surrounding adoption, should govern
embryo donations. This Article further argues that state
legislatures should clarify the effectiveness of contract law
within the field of embryo donation by defining embryos as
property for purposes of contract law and establishing
requirements associated with clinical consent forms that
ensure that ART patients make informed and binding
decisions about embryo disposition prior to undergoing
treatment.

∗ J.D., May 2016, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, many individuals and couples with infertility
issues have been able to achieve parenthood thanks to advances in
assisted reproductive technology (ART). 1 While the practice of
gamete donation 2 has existed for some time, donated embryos have,
in recent years, become available as a result of the fact that many
unused embryos are created as byproducts of other ART procedures. 3
Embryo donation is the transferring of legal rights to cryogenicallystored, unused human embryos that remain following the
administration of ART treatments. 4 The original owners of the
embryo (“progenitors”) consent to this transfer; the recipients
thereby obtain legal ownership of the embryo. 5 If the recipients are
themselves ART patients, they will have the embryo implanted and
gestated in hopes of producing a live child. 6 Some donors and
recipients prefer the term “embryo adoption.” 7
Embryo donation/adoption and other forms of frozen embryo
disposition8 raise a host of legal and ethical issues that have not yet
been resolved by courts and legislatures. 9 This Article will focus on
two of these issues: namely whether embryo donations should be
regulated in exactly the same manner as gamete donations or in ways
more akin to adoptions, and whether progenitors who have embryos
in storage should be legally bound to dispositional choices they made
before the embryos were even created.
A hypothetical is helpful to illustrate how one or both of these
issues might arise in the context of a typical couple’s ART
experience. A couple with infertility issues decides to undergo ART
treatment. During the couple’s first visit to the fertility clinic, they
1. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, The Technological Family: What’s New and What’s Not, 33
FAM. L.Q. 691, 692–94 (1999) (discussing use of ART in the United States).
2. Gamete donation refers to the use of donated human sperm or egg cells in the conception
of a child. See Michelle L. Anderson, Comment, Are You My Mommy? A Call for Regulation of
Embryo Donation, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 589, 598–600 (2006).
3. Id. at 598–602.
4. See id. at 600–02.
5. Id. at 600.
6. See id. at 601.
7. Maggie Davis, Maryland “Embryo Adoption”: Religious Entanglement in the Maryland
Stem Cell Research Act of 2006, 17 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 291, 318–20 (2014).
8. These other disposition options are typically: leaving the embryos frozen in storage,
donating them for research, or having them destroyed. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 125315(b) (West 2014).
9. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 593–95.
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are presented with a voluminous stack of paperwork to complete.
Among many forms relating to everything from health risks to
payment terms is a document that prompts the couple to select the
manner in which they would like to dispose of any embryos
remaining after their ART treatments have concluded. Without
giving it much thought—since there is so much paperwork to fill out,
and since the notion of having to dispose of excess embryos seems
extremely distant in this earliest stage of the ART process—the
couple decides that donating their excess embryos seems like the
charitable thing to do. Accordingly, they select embryo donation on
the disposition consent form. Years later, after the couple has had a
child and long forgotten about the paperwork that made him
possible, they receive a phone call from the fertility clinic. The clinic
informs them that someone has expressed interest in acquiring one of
their unused embryos. Should the couple now be able to revoke their
consent and prevent the clinic from handing their embryo over to
strangers? If the couple is still comfortable with allowing their excess
embryos to go to someone else, should they have a right to control
who gets the embryo or how much contact the couple will have with
the ultimate recipient? What about the child that results from the
embryo? Should that child have a right to learn the identities of his or
her biological parents?
This Article evaluates the existing statutory and decisional law
governing embryo donation as it applies to both donors and
recipients. Part II presents background information on the history of
embryo donation. Part III explains different approaches to regulating
embryo donation, discusses the legal implications of each approach,
and proposes an ideal solution for regulating the practice. Part IV
details the ways in which judicial decisions have construed clinical
consent forms indicating embryo disposition options and discusses
the policy arguments underlying these various determinations. Part
IV also advocates for an approach that best balances these competing
policy considerations.
Ultimately, this Article will argue that contract principles rather
than adoption-like principles should govern embryo donations and
that state legislatures should clarify the effectiveness of contract law
within the field of embryo donation by both (1) defining embryos as
property for purposes of contract law, and (2) establishing
requirements associated with clinical consent forms that ensure that
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ART patients make informed and binding decisions about embryo
disposition prior to undergoing treatment.
II. HISTORY OF EMBRYO DONATION
Though some ART methods have been around for centuries,
sophisticated techniques are a relatively recent phenomenon. The
earliest form of ART was artificial insemination, a method which
dates back as far as the eighteenth century. 10 This procedure simply
involves injecting the sperm of a man into the uterus of a woman by
means other than coitus. 11 Artificial insemination remained the only
technological method of achieving conception for many decades. 12
By the late 1970s, however, scientists had made great strides in the
field of ART. 13
The year 1978 marked the first live birth of a human child
conceived by way of in vitro fertilization (IVF). 14 IVF involves
extracting egg cells from a female and combining them with sperm
in a laboratory setting to produce human embryos. 15 Doctors implant
these embryos in the female’s uterus, where one or more of them
ideally develops into a child. Since its inception, IVF has become a
very effective means of facilitating conception. 16 In fact, it has
become so popular in the United States that more than 1 percent of
babies born in America each year are products of IVF. 17 Because of
IVF treatments, however, many couples find themselves with unused
embryos left in cryogenic storage. 18
Due to the expense, emotional hardship, and potential for
medical complication involved in the process of harvesting oocytes
and implanting embryos, it is standard practice for IVF practitioners
to prepare multiple embryos for implantation. 19 Un-implanted
embryos are cryogenically stored for future attempts should the
10. Davis, supra note 7, at 309.
11. Artificial Insemination, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/american_english/artificial-insemination (last visited Oct. 27, 2014).
12. See Davis, supra note 7, at 309.
13. See id. at 310.
14. Id.
15. Paul C. Redman II & Lauren Fielder Redman, Seeking a Better Solution for the
Disposition of Frozen Embryos: Is Embryo Adoption the Answer?, 35 TULSA L.J. 583, 584–85
(2000).
16. Davis, supra note 7, at 310.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. See Redman & Redman, supra note 15, at 586.
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initial embryos fail to result in a viable pregnancy. 20 Typically,
however, some embryos remain unused once IVF treatment has
proven successful. 21 Thus, couples who find themselves with surplus
embryos in storage are generally presented with a number of options
as to how to dispose of them. Couples may keep the embryos in
storage, have them destroyed, donate them to scientific research, or
donate them to others who are seeking to start families via ART.22
Each of these options has unique legal and moral implications. 23
Embryo donation is the process by which those who possess
unused embryos may transfer their legal rights to them to others who
wish to become parents. 24 Researchers achieved the first viable
pregnancy resulting from an embryo transfer in 1983 and saw the
first live birth of a child developed from a donated embryo in 1985. 25
Though doctors have been able to transfer embryos between fertility
patients for years, the practice has attracted attention only recently as
certain political groups have begun to argue that embryo transfers
should be regulated similarly to traditional adoptions. 26
Traditional adoptions differ from embryo donation transactions
in that they involve numerous legal formalities and procedures
designed to evaluate the fitness of prospective parents and to protect
the best interests of affected children. Embryo donations, conversely,
are typically effectuated through private arrangements between
consenting parties and are subject to much less scrutiny by
government agencies. 27 In recent years, however, certain adoption
agencies, have begun to offer “embryo adoptions.” Embryo
adoptions are embryo transfer transactions that are arranged similarly
to traditional adoptions, and that accordingly include the various
screening procedures characteristic of traditional adoptions. 28
Embryo adoptions differ from true adoptions in that the
procedural requirements that define them are voluntarily
20. See id.
21. See Davis, supra note 7, at 310.
22. See Redman & Redman, supra note 15, at 586–87.
23. Id.
24. Anderson, supra note 2, at 600.
25. Jennifer Baker, Comment, A War of Words: How Fundamentalist Rhetoric Threatens
Reproductive Autonomy, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 671, 686–87 (2009).
26. See Aaron Zitner, A Cold War on Embryo Adoptions, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2002, http://
articles.latimes.com/2002/mar/22/news/mn-34140.
27. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 607.
28. Polina M. Dostalik, Note, Embryo “Adoption”? The Rhetoric, the Law, and the Legal
Consequences, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 867, 873 (2011).
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implemented by private agencies. 29 Thus, in most cases, only
prospective parents who actively wish to acquire embryos through an
adoption-like procedure need subject themselves to screening
procedures akin to those associated with traditional adoption. Many
couples who choose such arrangements do so for religious reasons. 30
The term “embryo adoption” however is problematic because it
mischaracterizes the legal significance of embryo transfer
transactions.
In 1997, John and Marlene Strege became the first couple to
“adopt” an embryo. 31 Marlene, who had been diagnosed with
premature ovarian failure, 32 did not wish to conceive a child by
combining her husband’s sperm with a donor egg. 33 As she put it,
“[h]aving donor eggs fertilized by my husband would bring a third
person into our marriage.” 34 The Streges received ethical counseling
about the notion of adopting an embryo from Dr. James Dobson. 35
They then worked with their long-time family friend, Ron Stoddart
to arrange the donation of an embryo which was implanted in
Marlene’s uterus. 36 On December 31, 1998, Marlene gave birth to
her daughter, Hannah, the world’s very first “Snowflake Baby.” 37
Stoddart, a trained adoption attorney, was director of Nightlight
Christian Adoptions in Orange County, California at the time. 38 In
helping the Streges, he saw the potential to bring many more frozen

29. See Davis, supra note 7, at 319–20.
30. See id. at 320–21.
31. See Rick Monroe, Family Shares of Incredible Journey from Frozen Embryo to
Snowflake Teen, LIVE ACTION NEWS (Aug. 11, 2012, 1:50 PM), http://liveactionnews.org/familyshares-of-incredible-journey-from-frozen-embryo-to-snowflake-teen.
32. Rob Blackhurst, Would You Adopt an Embryo?, INDEPENDENT.IE (Oct. 28, 2013, 9:30
PM), http://www.independent.ie/life/family/mothers-babies/would-you-adopt-an-embryo-29704
187.html.
33. See Monroe, supra note 31.
34. Id.
35. See Meet the First Snowflake! (Embryo Adoption), CHRISTIAN LIFE RESOURCES, http://
www.christianliferesources.com/article/meet-the-first-snowflake-embryo-adoption-1317
(last
visited Apr. 20, 2015). Dr. James Dobson is a notable Christian activist who founded an
organization known as Focus on the Family, which strives to provide families with resources to
maintain healthy relationships. See Our Founder–Dr. James Dobson, FOCUS ON THE FAMILY,
http://www.focusonthefamily.com/about_us/james-dobson.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
36. See Monroe, supra note 31.
37. Id. “Snowflake Baby” is a term that Marlene Strege coined to refer to babies born as a
result of embryo adoption. She chose this term because she felt that embryos are like snowflakes:
each frozen, unique, and never again to be created. Id.
38. Id.
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embryos to life. 39 Nightlight has facilitated the births of hundreds of
Snowflake Babies since Hannah. 40 The agency distinguishes its
“embryo adoption” program from the embryo donation services
offered by fertility clinics, explaining that Nightlight takes care to
execute embryo transfers in a manner analogous to traditional
adoptions. 41 Nightlight ensures that potential embryo recipients
undergo home studies, 42 and that families who choose to donate their
embryos are able to select the parents with whom those embryos will
ultimately be placed. 43
Many organizations have followed in Nightlight’s footsteps,
offering “embryo adoptions” rather than simple transfers of embryo
ownership from donor to recipient. 44 Couples seeking an “embryo
adoption” “must complete an application, traditional adoption home
study, adoption education program, undergo health checks, and pay a
fee.” 45 In most states, none of these steps are legal requirements for
obtaining ownership of an embryo. 46 Thus, a couple that simply
wants to obtain a donated embryo can do so from a fertility clinic
without submitting to any comparable screening procedures.
Donors too may choose whether to donate their embryos
through agencies offering “embryo adoptions” or fertility clinics. 47 If
they decide on the latter option, a clinic may post anonymous
information about the genetic characteristics of the donors’ embryo
on its website for interested embryo seekers to peruse. If prospective
parents who desire the embryo are deemed a match for it after basic

39. See id.
40. Id.
41. See Frequently Asked Adoption Questions–FAQs, NIGHTLIGHT CHRISTIAN ADOPTIONS,
https://www.nightlight.org/faqs (last visited Oct. 28, 2014).
42. A “home study” is a two- to four-month process designed to instruct and evaluate a
couple looking to become adoptive parents. Home studies consist of education, interviews, and
paperwork intended to build parenting skills in those seeking to adopt, and to help both the
prospective parents and the adoption agency determine the couple’s preparedness to become the
parents of an adopted child. Id.; Home Study Services and Family Assessments, NIGHTLIGHT
CHRISTIAN ADOPTIONS, https://www.nightlight.org/home-study-services/ (last visited Jan. 12,
2015).
43. Frequently Asked Adoption Questions–FAQs, supra note 41.
44. See Embryo Adoption Agencies, EMBRYO ADOPTION AWARENESS CENTER, http://
www.embryoadoption.org/adoption_agencies/embryo_adoption_services_matrix.cfm (last visited
Mar. 11, 2015).
45. Dostalik, supra note 28, at 874.
46. See id.
47. Sarah Elizabeth Richards, Get Used to Embryo Adoption, TIME (Aug. 24, 2013),
http://ideas.time.com/2013/08/24/get-used-to-embryo-adoption.
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physical and psychological testing, they will acquire the embryo
anonymously. 48
An “adoption” approach gives donors much more control over
the recipients of their embryos. It also enables donors to maintain
contact with the adoptive family should they choose to do so, a
feature which many donors seem to desire. 49 Indeed, a representative
for the National Embryo Donation Center recently reported that more
than half of donors prefer at least some degree of openness in their
donation transactions. 50 Whichever approach participants choose,
embryo donation is an attractive option for many couples hoping to
become parents because it enables mothers to experience pregnancy,
and it is relatively inexpensive as compared to other forms of ART.51
Thus, embryo donation is likely to continue to grow in popularity. 52
III. CONTRACT PRINCIPLES VERSUS ADOPTION PRINCIPLES: WHICH
SHOULD CONTROL EMBRYO DONATION TRANSACTIONS?
A. Present State of the Law
Currently, a lack of clear and consistent regulation has forced
families to rely on private contracts to delineate rights they acquire in
donated embryos. 53 Further, little directly applicable precedent is
available to guide courts in resolving disputes that arise from such
contracts. 54 These circumstances have led to tremendous uncertainty
in the law. 55
The difficulty of regulating embryo donation begins with the
uncertain legal status of embryos. 56 This varies by jurisdiction and is
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Dostalik, supra note 28, at 874 (“The average cost of adopting an embryo, not including
fertility clinic charges and medical fees for implantation, is approximately $4,500. It is less
expensive than both IVF and traditional adoption, which can cost as much as $15,000 and
$30,000, respectively.” (citations omitted)).
52. With the number of frozen embryos remaining in cryopreservation across the United
States now exceeding 600,000 by some estimates, this problem is significant. Did You Know?,
EMBRYO ADOPTION AWARENESS CENTER, http://www.embryoadoption.org/videos/vp_Did_You
_Know.cfm (last visited Oct. 30, 2014). The current number of stored frozen embryos represents
a 54 percent increase since 2002. Id.
53. See Dostalik, supra note 28, at 869.
54. Id.
55. See Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, Embryo Donation: Unresolved Legal
Issues in the Transfer of Surplus Cryopreserved Embryos, 49 VILL. L. REV. 169, 176 (2004).
56. See Dostalik, supra note 28, at 875.
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often unclearly defined. 57 Three basic views exist as to the
personhood of embryos. 58 The first view is based on the notion that
life begins at conception, a position that underlies political
movements opposing abortion, stem cell research, and similar
issues. 59 Under this ideology, an embryo possesses the same legal
status as a living human being. 60 At the other end of the spectrum is
the view that embryos are mere property, no different than any other
possessions. 61 Finally, there exists a moderate position that considers
embryos to be a form of property deserving of “special respect” due
to their potentiality for life. 62 The legal status of embryos has a
critical influence on the way in which embryo transfer transactions
are regulated. If embryos are nothing but ordinary property then they
are clearly subject to contract law; if they occupy the same legal
status as human beings, however, then an argument exists that
prospective parents must acquire them through adoption-like
procedures. 63 Finally, if embryos are property deserving of “special
respect,” it is unclear what legal principles should apply to them. 64
Louisiana is the only state to have expressly embraced the
embryo-as-person stance, 65 having passed a statute that defines an
embryo as “a juridical person . . . recognized as a separate entity
apart from the medical facility or clinic where it is housed or
stored.” 66 Other states, however, have enacted statutes suggesting
similar consideration of embryos. 67
Though no state statutes embody the embryo-as-property
position, many courts have embraced it. 68 The Oregon Court of
Appeals, for example, has held that “the contractual right to possess
or dispose of . . . frozen embryos is personal property that is subject

57. See Davis, supra note 7, at 318.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 317–18.
60. Id. at 318.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Dostalik, supra note 28, at 878.
64. Angela K. Upchurch, A Postmodern Deconstruction of Frozen Embryo Disputes, 39
CONN. L. REV. 2107, 2123 (2007).
65. Dostalik, supra note 28, at 876.
66. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:125 (1986).
67. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (2010) (“The life of each human being begins at
conception; [u]nborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being . . . .”).
68. Dostalik, supra note 28, at 877.
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to a ‘just and proper’ division.” 69 Other courts have applied contract
law to the disposition of embryos, and thus implicitly held
similarly. 70
The Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Davis 71
exemplifies the intermediate position that embryos are to be
accorded a legal status somewhere between people and property. 72
Davis involved a divorce dispute in which a wife sought custody of
embryos that she and her husband had had prepared during their
marriage. 73 The wife wished to retain custody of the embryos so that
she could use them to become pregnant after the divorce, while the
husband wanted the embryos to remain frozen. 74 The trial court
decided that embryos were human beings from the moment of
fertilization, and it accordingly granted custody of the embryos to
Mrs. Davis. 75 The appellate court reversed this decision, however,
and the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the reversal. 76 As that
Court explained, “[w]e conclude that pre-embryos are not, strictly
speaking, either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occupy an interim
category that entitles them to special respect because of their
potential for human life.” 77
B. Issues Raised by the Competing Approaches
Each of the three approaches that states have taken in defining
the personhood of embryos carries with it distinct legal advantages
and disadvantages. Because the legal status of embryos dictates the
principles that will control transfers of embryo ownership, this
section will explain the relative merits of the approaches.
1. The Embryo as a Person
Early American common law did not accord any degree of
personhood to embryos. 78 Before the late nineteenth century,
69. In re Marriage of Dahl & Angle, 194 P.3d 834, 839 (Or. 2008).
70. See Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 506–10 (discussing application of contract
law to the disposition of frozen embryos, and recognizing that “the contractual approach has been
applied/endorsed in five states”).
71. 842 S.W.2d 588 (1992).
72. See Dostalik, supra note 28, at 876–77.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 876.
75. Id. at 876–77.
76. Id.
77. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
78. See Davis, supra note 7, at 295.
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abortion was legal in the United States prior to the “quickening” 79
stage of pregnancy. 80 Notably, later movements toward the
criminalization of abortion in America were fueled not by reverence
for the personhood of unborn children, but rather largely by growing
societal disdain for “indecent” behavior. 81 Late nineteenth century
Americans opposed abortion not because they felt that fetuses were
human beings whose rights needed to be protected, but rather
because prohibiting abortion would curb promiscuous behavior and
promote the societal goal of female chastity before marriage. 82 The
Supreme Court addressed the issue of the personhood of unborn
children in the landmark case of Roe v. Wade. 83 The Roe Court
stated: “the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons
in the whole sense.” 84
The Roman Catholic Church views things differently, however,
as that institution has expressed its belief that embryos are fully
human. 85 Italy has embraced the Vatican’s position, and accordingly
that nation’s IVF regulations permit the harvesting of no more than
three eggs per IVF cycle, all of which must be implanted in the
patient undergoing treatment. 86
Louisiana’s large Catholic population appears to have
influenced the state’s active classification of the embryo as a
“juridical person.” 87 While Louisiana’s reverence for human life is
admirable, its position on the personhood of embryos is untenable in
contemporary America.
First, the “embryo-as-person” position makes little sense in light
of Roe v. Wade. 88 That case gave women the right to abort nonviable
fetuses. 89 Thus, if embryos are to be considered people, a woman
would be forbidden to destroy one while it remained cryogenically
79. Quickening is the time at which a pregnant woman first becomes aware of fetal
movement. This usually occurs between the twelfth and sixteenth weeks of gestation. Id.
80. Id. at 295–96.
81. Id. at 296–99.
82. Id. at 297.
83. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
84. Id. at 162.
85. Shirley Darby Howell, The Frozen Embryo: Scholarly Theories, Case Law, and
Proposed State Regulation, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 407, 411 (2013).
86. Id. at 411–12. Notably, New Mexico has taken a similar approach to regulating IVF,
mandating that all in vitro fertilized eggs be implanted in human female recipients. Id. at 412.
87. See id. at 412.
88. See id.
89. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
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preserved, but she would be permitted to abort it once it had been
implanted in her uterus. 90 Second, classifying an embryo as a person
implies that destroying it is tantamount to murder. 91 This would very
likely inhibit use of IVF in the United States, as IVF providers would
surely fear both civil and criminal consequences of harming
embryos. 92
Categorizing embryos as persons could cause further difficulties
in the context of embryo disposition disputes, as the “person”
designation would force courts to decide such disputes under a “best
interests of the child” analysis. 93 Not only would such an approach
undermine parties’ reliance interests in any disposition agreement
they may have entered prior to undergoing IVF, 94 but also, the
efficacy of a “best interests of the child” test being applied to a child
who has not yet been born is highly questionable. 95
Thus, it seems that classifying embryos as human beings will
likely prove extremely problematic. Accordingly, the policy that this
approach embodies, namely affording the greatest possible protection
to potential human lives, is easily outweighed by practical
considerations in this context, and states that have not yet codified
the legal status of embryos should avoid this flawed approach.
Indeed, though the Louisiana and New Mexico statutes have not yet
been challenged in court, they have been described as
“constitutionally weak and unenforceable as a practical matter.” 96
2. The Embryo as Property
A position that views embryos as mere property subject to the
same rules as all other chattels may also bring about undesirable
ramifications. Ordinary property may be sold, traded, or destroyed by
its owner at his or her will. 97 To suggest that progenitors of embryos
have complete freedom to dispose of them in any of these ways is
disquieting. To begin with, most ethicists and professional
organizations discourage direct payment for embryos, and some

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See Howell, supra note 85, at 412.
Davis, supra note 7, at 316.
Id.
Upchurch, supra note 64, at 2121.
See Howell, supra note 85, at 416–17.
Upchurch, supra note 64, at 2121.
Howell, supra note 85, at 413.
See id.
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states prohibit such compensation by statute. 98 This strong
opposition to the sale of embryos demonstrates that many view them
to be inherently distinct from other items of personal property. This
is logical considering the biological potential of embryos, and the
rigid formalism that characterizes property law.
If embryos have the same legal status as ordinary objects, then
ownership disputes would focus solely on the relative rights of
claimants. 99 Thus, the interests of a potential child that might result
from an embryo would be entirely absent from such a contest, which
would boil down to a routine title determination.100 This framework
would lead to further complications related to other aspects of
property law. For example, it would be possible for legal and
equitable title to an embryo to become vested in different parties, and
it would also be possible for an embryo to become part of a
decedent’s estate, and thus transferable by will or intestate
succession. 101 The notion that the rigid rules of property law could
create a situation wherein an individual’s embryos end up in the
possession of someone who was never designated to acquire them,
and who was not chosen based on consideration of the best interests
of children that could result from the embryos is highly
discomforting.
Thus, subjecting embryos to all aspects of property law is bound
to produce numerous ethically questionable results. This approach is
also less than ideal, but is perhaps preferable to the “embryo-asperson” position, whose troubling implications seem decidedly more
immediate and severe in that they both create a legal paradox and
potentially subject IVF practitioners to the risk of criminal liability
for negligent conduct. 102
3. The Embryo as an Interim Category
Deserving of “Special Respect”
Squarely defining embryos as either people or property creates
significant problems when the full scope of rules applicable to either
98. Executive Summary of Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Analysis and
Recommendations for Public Policy, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, https://www.health.ny.gov/
regulations/task_force/reports_publications/execsum.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
99. Katheleen R. Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted Reproduction and the
Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 193, 206 (1997).
100. See id.
101. Id. at 206–07.
102. See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text.
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category is considered. Thus, the intermediate approach to defining
the legal status of embryos would seem most sensible. This approach
too, however, is not without its imperfections.
In deciding to implement the intermediate approach in Davis v.
Davis, 103 the Tennessee Supreme Court relied largely on the ethical
standards set forth by the Ethics Committee of the American Fertility
Society. 104 The Davis court cited a report by the Ethics Committee
that justified the intermediate view of an embryo’s legal status on
grounds that an embryo “has not yet developed the features of
personhood, is not yet established as developmentally individual, and
may never realize its biologic potential.” 105
The Davis court ultimately stated that embryos “occupy an
interim category [between persons and property] that entitles them to
special respect because of their potential for human life.” 106 Most
courts and commentators have embraced this view, but its exact
meaning remains somewhat unclear. 107 In practice, the “special
respect” status gives embryo progenitors the authority to create
contracts concerning the use or disposition of their embryos, and
implies that disputes arising from such contracts will be adjudicated
in light of the progenitors’ constitutional interests in procreation.108
Stating that embryos are deserving of “special respect” seems to
imply that courts would favor preservation or implantation of
embryos over their destruction or continued storage, but in fact, the
opposite appears to be true. 109
In favoring an individual’s right not to procreate, American
courts have relied on two basic grounds. The first is that “the law
shall not be used as a mechanism for forcing [family] relationships
when they are not desired . . . [because] respect for liberty and
privacy requires that individuals be accorded the freedom to decide

103. 842 SW.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
104. Id. at 596. The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society is now known as the
American Society for Reproductive Medicine Ethics Committee. Alyssa Lechmanik, Student
Work: The Battle Over The Embryo: How West Virginia Should Legally Define the Embryo and
Regulate Embryo Adoption, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 701, 716 (2013).
105. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596.
106. Id. at 597.
107. See Howell, supra note 85, at 414.
108. Upchurch, supra note 64, at 2123.
109. Howell, supra note 85, at 415; see also, e.g., Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604 (“Ordinarily, the
party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail . . . .”).
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whether to enter into a family relationship.” 110 The second is that
favoring the rights of an individual who seeks to avoid parenthood
allows parties who are in conflict about their respective rights to
frozen embryos to maintain the status quo by keeping those embryos
frozen until they can come to a mutual decision as to how to dispose
of them. 111
A significant problem with the “property deserving of special
respect” status as it is currently applied is that it leaves open the
possibility that a court may look to any number of different legal
standards to resolve a dispute involving embryos. 112 In practice,
courts tend to apply principles of property law in adjudicating
embryo disputes because analyzing such disputes within a propertylike framework enables courts to better manage them within the
adversarial legal system. 113 The difference between embryos
occupying the legal status of ordinary property and them being
designated as “property deserving of special respect,” however, is
that courts are not required to adhere to all property principles in
such cases. 114 This is problematic because it introduces a degree of
unpredictability into embryo disputes.
C. Proposing a Solution
The fact that any embryo donation transaction involves the
transfer of genetic material that has the full potential to develop into
a child has prompted many to analogize the practice to traditional
adoption. While such a comparison may appear logical at first
glance, the parallels between embryo donation and traditional
adoption begin to break down upon examination of the essential
mechanics of adoption law.
Arguments in favor of regulating embryo transfer transactions
under adoption law find their basis in the view that life begins at
conception. 115 This position is popular in the religious, pro-life
community, and is justified in part by the belief that each embryo has

110. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000); but see CA 2401/95 Nahmani v.
Nahmani 50(4) IsrLR 1 [1996] (Isr.) (embracing contrary reasoning based on biblical teachings).
111. See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 778, 783 (Iowa 2003).
112. See Upchurch, supra note 64, at 2123.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Baker, supra note 25, at 685.
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a unique composition. 116 Proponents of embryo adoption argue that
treating the embryo transfer process like a traditional adoption
affords receiving parents beneficial guidance and counseling, and
that it also ensures that donating parents are given more control over
the placement of their embryos, which will ultimately grow into
children who share their genetic material. 117 While these features
may be desirable in the embryo donation context, it is clear that most
courts and legislatures remain unconvinced that adoption law should
apply to embryos. 118
While the acquisition of a frozen embryo may seem to resemble
an adoption in certain respects, numerous aspects of adoption law are
inappropriate in this context.119 Part of the difficulty involved in
attempting to apply adoption principles to embryo donation arises
from the fact that a child resulting from this procedure necessarily
has at least three biological parents, namely the two individuals
whose genetic material comprises the donated embryo, and the
mother who ultimately gives birth to the child that develops from the
embryo. 120 Adoption law generally assumes that a child has only one
set of biological parents, and its purpose is to sever a child’s ties to
these individuals and to create a new familial relationship between
the child and another, distinct set of parents. 121 In an embryo
donation scenario, the birth mother is typically the intended mother
of the resulting child, and her parentage must thus be maintained. 122
Other features of adoption law further demonstrate that it is not
suitable for application to transactions involving embryos. Most
states make it illegal for a mother to consent to adoption before her
child is born, and all states recognize a period after the child is born
during which the birth mother can rescind her consent to adoption.123
These basic tenets of adoption law clearly cannot be applied in the
context of embryo transfers.
116. See id.
117. See Frequently Asked Adoption Questions–FAQs, supra note 41.
118. See Frequent Questions: Adopting Parents, EMBRYO ADOPTION AWARENESS CENTER,
http://www.embryoadoption.org/faqs/adopting.cfm (last visited Nov. 22, 2014) (“In the United
States embryos are considered property, not people and therefore the ‘owners’ [the donors] of the
embryos transfer the ownership to the recipient family via contract law.”).
119. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 615.
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Dostalik, supra note 28, at 885–86.
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Finally, because fewer than one third of embryo transfers
ultimately result in the birth of children, if such transactions were
governed by adoption law, most would involve extensive preplacement procedures that would ultimately prove unnecessary due
to the failure of an embryo donation to result in a live birth. 124
For all these reasons, contract law is much more suitable for the
regulation of embryo donations. Moreover, even if contract law
controls, the main advantages of adoption law, namely the security
and control associated with its extensive screening procedures, are
available to donors and recipients who choose to conduct their
embryo transfers through agencies that voluntarily implement
adoption-like procedures. Current problems with contract law stem
from the uncertain legal status of embryos. The fact that some states
have either failed to define the personhood of embryos, or have
defined it unclearly makes the enforceability of privately drafted
embryo transfer contracts uncertain.
It is thus of paramount importance that the enforceability of
embryo donation agreements be made predictable. State legislatures
could ensure such predictability, while still allowing courts the
flexibility to avoid having to make rulings that contravene the policy
of giving special deference to the potential for life that embryos
embody, by according a contextually variable legal status upon
embryos. Legislatures could accomplish this by passing statutes that
expressly delineate the manner in which embryos are to be
considered in different categories of legal disputes.
Tennessee, for example, has embraced the “property deserving
of special respect” view of embryo personhood. 125 Additionally,
however, the Tennessee Legislature has passed a statute that
expressly subjects transfers of embryo ownership to contract law.126
Section 36-2-403 of the Tennessee Code explicitly states that embryo
transfers may be effected via contract, and thus enables parties to an
embryo transfer to arrange the transaction with certainty that contract
principles will control it. 127 By taking the simple act of explicitly
codifying Tennessee’s position on the applicability of contract law in
the embryo donation context, the state’s legislature has greatly
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 886.
See supra Part III.B.3.
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-403 (2014).
See id.
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facilitated embryo transactions within its borders by signaling to the
practitioners involved which legal principles will govern. Moreover,
the state remains free to recognize the “special respect” due to
embryos by passing additional statutes that treat embryos differently
in other contexts. The legislature could, for example, declare that the
best interests of a child that might result from an embryo are to
determine its ownership in the event that the embryo must pass by
intestate succession.
By passing statutes that dictate the ways in which embryos are
to be treated under different bodies of law, state legislatures can
embrace an intermediate position on embryo personhood without
doing so in a manner that makes the law governing transfers of
embryo ownership unclear. Such an approach would greatly improve
the legal landscape surrounding embryo donation.
IV. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER TO ENFORCE CLINICAL
CONSENT FORMS AS CONTRACTS
Many fertility clinics require patients preparing to undergo IVF
to sign consent forms by which those individuals indicate an option
for the disposition of excess embryos. 128 Such options typically
include donation for research, donation for use by another fertility
patient, continued storage, or destruction. A few states have even
passed statutes requiring clinics to provide such forms. 129 Though
these forms are intended to prevent disputes over embryo disposition,
their legal effect is often unclear. 130 The manner in which a court
will ultimately interpret them thus depends largely on the legal status
of embryos within the state where that court sits.
California is among the states requiring fertility clinics to
provide embryo disposition consent forms to patients. 131 Section
125315 of the California Health and Safety Code is typical of state
statutes governing the provision of embryo disposition consent forms
in terms of the options it describes, as well as the fact that it is silent
regarding the enforceability of the forms. 132 Section 125315 requires
that doctors administering fertility treatments provide their patients
128. Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition and Divorce: Why Clinic Consent Forms Are
Not the Answer, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 57, 58–59 (2011).
129. Id. at 59.
130. See id.
131. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315 (West 2014).
132. See Forman, supra note 128, at 90.
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with “timely, relevant, and appropriate information to allow the
individual to make an informed and voluntary choice regarding the
disposition of any human embryos remaining following the fertility
treatment.” 133 The statute goes on to provide dispositional options to
follow a number of potential circumstances, including death of either
or both partners in a couple, separation of partners, or abandonment
of embryos. 134
A. Current Approaches
State courts have reached opposing decisions on the issue of
whether to enforce clinic consent forms as contracts. 135 In Kass v.
Kass, 136 the New York Court of Appeals became the first to consider
a marital dissolution case involving the disposition of embryos in
which the parties had signed an agreement with their IVF provider
concerning embryo storage. 137 Reasoning that embryos were not to
be considered “persons,” and that parties should be encouraged to
think through contingencies relating to embryo disposition and to
express their wishes carefully in writing prior to undergoing IVF
treatment, the Kass court held that disposition agreements between
embryo progenitors should generally be presumed valid and
binding. 138 Many other courts have followed this approach, and one
has even gone so far as to enforce a cryopreservation agreement
provision mandating the destruction of embryos despite both
progenitors’ wishes to the contrary during their divorce
proceedings. 139
In Litowitz, the Washington Supreme Court decided an embryo
custody dispute between a divorcing husband and wife. The couple
had two embryos stored in cryopreservation that had been created
from the husband’s sperm and donor eggs. 140 At the time of the
litigation, the wife desired to have the embryos implanted in a
surrogate, while the husband wanted to make them available for
donation. 141 Prior to having their embryos cryopreserved, however,
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

HEALTH & SAFETY § 125315.
Id.
Forman, supra note 128, at 59.
696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
In re Marriage of Dahl & Angle, 194 P.3d 834, 839 (Or. 2008).
Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 179–80.
Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 271 (Wash. 2002).
Id. at 262–63.
Forman, supra note 128, at 63.
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the couple had signed a disposition agreement with the storage
facility in which they indicated that they wanted their embryos
destroyed if the embryos remained in storage five years after the
initial date of cryopreservation and the couple did not request that the
facility extend the storage period. 142
In coming to its decision, the Litowitz court cited decisions from
several other jurisdictions, including Davis and Kass. Quoting Davis,
the court stated that
disputes involving the disposition of pre-embryos produced
by in vitro fertilization should be resolved, first, by looking
to the preferences of the progenitors. If their wishes cannot
be ascertained, or if there is dispute, then their prior
agreement concerning disposition should be carried out. If
no prior agreement exists, then the relative interests of the
parties in using or not using the pre-embryos must be
weighed. 143
Since the Litowitzes did not agree on the manner in which their
embryos should be disposed of, the court turned to their
cryopreservation agreement. It then embraced the reasoning of the
Kass court: “[a]dvance directives, subject to mutual change of mind
that must be jointly expressed, both minimize misunderstandings and
maximize procreative liberty by reserving to the progenitors the
authority to make what is in the first instance a quintessentially
personal, private decision.” 144
Some courts, however, have taken a “contemporaneous consent”
approach to enforcement of embryo disposition consent forms. While
these courts also presume such forms to be binding, they will not
enforce the disposition provisions in them in disputes between the
embryo progenitors where one has changed his or her mind. 145 This
approach makes disposition agreements likely to be enforced in
disputes between couples and IVF clinics rather than between the
embryo progenitors themselves. 146
The Iowa Supreme Court took the contemporaneous consent
approach in In re Marriage of Witten. 147 That case concerned a
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 268.
Id. at 265 (quoting Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (1992)).
Id. at 267 (quoting Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998)).
Forman, supra note 128, at 63.
Id.
672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003).
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couple who had signed a cryopreservation agreement form that
required both parties to consent to any use or disposition of the
embryos they had in storage. When the couple entered divorce
proceedings, the wife sought to have the embryos implanted in her or
a surrogate so that she could have a child, while the husband opposed
use of the embryos in this manner. The trial court gave effect to the
couple’s agreement, and thus enjoined both parties from using the
embryos. 148 The wife challenged the trial court’s ruling on grounds
that enforcement of the agreement would violate public policy by
allowing the husband to back out of his implicit agreement to have
children with her. 149 The court rejected the wife’s public policy
argument and proceeded to address the question of whether an
embryo disposition agreement should be enforced after one party has
become uncomfortable with his or her prior decisions as expressed in
that agreement. 150
Reasoning that “judicial decisions and statutes in Iowa reflect
respect for the right of individuals to make family and reproductive
decisions based on their current views and values . . . [and] reveal
awareness that such decisions are highly emotional in nature and
subject to a later change of heart,” the court held that embryo
disposition agreements signed at the time of in vitro fertilization are
binding on the parties subject to the right of either party to change
his or her mind up to the point of use or destruction of any stored
embryo. 151 The court went on to state that if parties to a dispute
cannot reach a consensus as to what to do with their stored embryos,
those embryos will remain in storage indefinitely with the party or
parties opposing destruction held responsible for paying the storage
fees. 152
B. Policy Considerations
Courts that have held IVF consent forms to be enforceable as
contracts have done so with the intent of incentivizing embryo
progenitors to consider carefully the possible consequences of
preserving embryos in cryogenic storage prior to ordering the

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 772–73.
Id.
Id. at 780.
Id. at 782.
Id. at 783.
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embryos to be created. 153 Another important justification for
enforcing such forms as contracts is the reliance interests of the IVF
patients who sign them. 154 If the members of a couple intelligently
agree to dispose of their embryos in a specified manner prior to
undergoing IVF treatment, each member’s assent to that
dispositional option may be fundamentally intertwined with his or
her agreement to the IVF treatment. 155
For example, a husband who is uncomfortable with having
genetic children outside of his marriage may agree to undergo IVF
only because he signed a consent form that assured him that embryos
remaining in storage after his death or in the event of a divorce
would be destroyed. If a court were later to determine that the
consent form did not constitute a binding contract, the husband’s
expectations would be violated. 156 Essentially, a court’s refusal to
uphold the provisions of the consent form could lead to the continued
preservation of embryos that would never have existed had the
husband not believed that the form’s provisions would be
enforced. 157
Though decisions regarding embryo disposition can often be a
sensitive issue, and progenitors may change their minds for a variety
of reasons, scholars have argued that enforcing disposition
agreements signed prior to the administration of IVF treatment is the
best way to give infertile couples control over what becomes of their
embryos. 158 Enforcing such agreements enables the embryo
progenitors to direct their futures as parents, while invalidating them
enables the courts, strangers to the progenitors, to do so. 159
While giving effect to embryo progenitors’ intent with respect to
embryo disposition options is a desirable policy goal, some have
argued that enforcing agreements entered into via consent forms
signed prior to the administration of IVF is an ineffective way of
achieving this goal. 160

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179–80 (N.Y. 1998).
See Howell, supra note 85, at 416–18.
See id. at 416–17.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 417.
Id. at 417–18.
See Forman, supra note 128, at 66.
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One major problem with IVF consent forms is procedural.
Provisions governing embryo disposition often constitute one small
part of a voluminous document that fertility clinics give to patients at
the beginning of the IVF process. 161 Such a document typically
covers various aspects of cryopreservation including risks and
benefits of the procedure, storage limitations, and payment terms. 162
This type of consent packet may obscure the significance of embryo
disposition provisions by failing clearly to distinguish them from
other topics, and by presenting them in technically worded language
and a densely printed format. 163
Even when disposition agreements are presented separately from
other forms associated with initiating the IVF process, significant
problems still exist. A couple undergoing IVF may be required to
sign many consent forms in a single day, and the overwhelming
volume of information presented by all these documents may hinder
the couple’s ability to consider each one thoughtfully. 164 This
phenomenon is particularly problematic in the context of initiating a
fertility treatment, as patients typically experience heightened
emotions while they concentrate on having a child, and may be
unable to consider seriously all manner of worst-case scenarios as
they focus on becoming parents. 165 While it is true that many
transactions in today’s world entail the execution of numerous forms
whose combined content may be difficult for a signer to grasp fully,
IVF consent forms present unique dangers, as they prompt couples to
consider numerous complicated hypothetical scenarios that would
arise from traumatic changes to a couple’s relationship. 166 The
variety and complexity of such scenarios, as well as the remoteness
of these scenarios at the time of signing can make it very difficult for
IVF patients to consider their consent paperwork with the degree of
intelligence that it demands.
Aside from the procedural defects associated with fertility clinic
consent forms, embryo disposition agreements entered into prior to
administration of IVF suffer from extreme substantive

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 67.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 68–69.
Id. at 69–70.
See id.
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deficiencies. 167 To begin with, numerous studies have shown that
fertility patients find embryo disposition decisions to be exceedingly
difficult on moral and emotional levels. 168 Further, research has
demonstrated that patients’ views toward embryo disposition often
change significantly over time. 169
The instability of fertility patients’ attitudes toward disposition
is attributable to numerous factors. First, these attitudes are strongly
influenced by patients’ experiences with IVF. 170 Prior to initial
treatment, patients may not seriously consider dispositional options
because they do not know how many IVF cycles it will take to
achieve pregnancy, and they are thus unable fully to grasp the
implications of keeping excess embryos in storage. 171 Because
patients who have not yet undergone IVF do not fully appreciate the
consequences of their dispositional decisions, they tend to feel a
relatively high level of confidence in these decisions. 172
Studies indicate that things change significantly once IVF
treatment has been administered. 173 At this stage, couples more
frequently feel conflicted over their dispositional decisions, and
partners more frequently experience conflict with each other. 174 The
birth of a child as a result of IVF treatment often has particularly
significant effects on fertility patients’ attitudes toward embryo
disposition.175 For example, while patients often wish to donate their
embryos to research or to other childless couples prior to and during
treatment, once patients have succeeded in having children, they are
more inclined to prefer that their embryos be discarded. 176
The extreme difficulty that couples face in arriving at decisions
related to embryo disposition and the susceptibility of these decisions
to change exacerbate the significant procedural deficiencies
associated with IVF consent forms. Thus, enforcing consent forms as
contracts appears to be a less than ideal method of effectuating the

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See id. at 70.
See id. at 70–71.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 72.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 73.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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parties’ true intentions with regard to the fate of their frozen
embryos.
C. Striking a Balance
An effective way in which to approach the enforcement of
consent forms may be to address the issue of how informed the
progenitors were at the time at which they signed. In J.B. v. M.B.,177
the New Jersey Supreme Court declined to enforce an embryo
disposition agreement entered by way of an IVF clinic consent
form. 178 Despite this, though, the court stated that it would enforce
embryo disposition agreements entered at the time of IVF treatment
if such agreements were written in plain language, adequately
explained to the parties prior to execution, and made subject to the
right of either party to change his or her mind prior to the use or
destruction of embryos. 179
In February 2008, the American Bar Association introduced its
Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology (“Model
ART Act”) that embodies an approach similar to that endorsed by the
J.B. court. 180 Article 5 of the Model ART Act states that “[b]inding
agreements executed prior to embryo creation must be entered into a
record by intended parents as to . . . [i]ntended use and disposition of
embryos.” 181 The Model ART Act also provides that “[s]uch
agreements may be amended at any time prior to transfer of an
embryo or the death of either intended parent.” 182 Further, the Model
Act takes measures to ensure that IVF patients intelligently consent
to the conditions of their disposition agreements. 183
The ART Model Act’s informed-consent provisions mandate
that prior to treatment, ART providers advise patients regarding the
need for them to enter binding agreements regarding embryo
disposition.184 The Act functions to make this need intelligible to
patients by stipulating that it must be communicated to them both

177. 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).
178. Id. at 713–14.
179. Id. at 719.
180. Dostalik, supra note 28, at 869.
181. ABA MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 501 (2008), http://apps.
americanbar.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf.
182. Id.
183. See id. §§ 201–202.
184. Id. § 201(2)(j).
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orally and in plain-language writing. 185 By insisting that patients
receive clear notice regarding the legal effect of the disposition
agreements they must sign, the Act reduces the problem of defective
consent that is often present in the context of IVF clinical consent
forms.
The ABA has also created a proposed model act to govern the
licensing of ART agencies. 186 This document may implement further
measures to ensure that ART patients sign clinical consent forms
intelligently. Though the ABA’s Family Law Section has not yet
approved this new act, the current draft addresses some deficiencies
in the Model ART Act. Section 304 of the new act, for example,
enumerates a number of counseling requirements that an agency
must comport with prior to administering ART treatment to a
patient. 187 Under section 304, ART agencies must advise their
patients to “seek advice from medical, psychological, legal, and any
other relevant third party professionals to discuss the potential risks
and outcomes of the process.” 188 Agencies must also give each
patient an opportunity to consult with an attorney before
treatment. 189
The ABA has also stated that it intends to supplement its Model
ART Act “with a statement of necessary provisions and standards of
best practice for drafting the informed consents and various ART
agreements suggested or required by this Act and, to the extent
possible, develop model forms.” 190
Should the ABA fully approve the new act and follow through
with its intentions to supplement its model statutes, the result will
likely be extremely beneficial to the practice of embryo donation.
ABA approved embryo donation consent forms would help to set
standards for legally effective language, while newly-imposed ART
agency counseling requirements would ensure that IVF patients
execute their consent forms thoughtfully, and would thus cause these

185. Id. §§ 201(2), 202(1)(a).
186. ABA MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. AGENCIES (Proposed Draft
2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/aba-model-act-agency-regulations-2.pdf.
187. Id. § 304.
188. Id. § 304(1)(f).
189. Id. § 304(1)(b).
190. ABA MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., supra note 181, Prefatory
Note.

840

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:813

forms to be more reflective of progenitors’ actual intent with respect
to embryo disposition questions.
If state legislatures passed statutes based on the ABA’s Model
ART Act, many of the problems created by current consent forms
could be reduced. States that have already enacted statutes requiring
parties to execute some kind of consent form prior to commencing
IVF treatment could amend these laws to impose additional
requirements on disposition agreements that would make them better
reflect the intentions of the parties that enter them.
A statute could, for example, require that fertility clinics not
only compel patients to sign plain-language disposition agreements
prior to commencing IVF treatments, but that these clinics also
provide legal counsel to the patients, who must make sure that the
patients fully understand every provision of these agreements prior to
signing. Statutes could further state that if clinics comply with their
provisions, the disposition agreement consent forms signed by IVF
patients become presumptively enforceable as contracts. It seems
logical for states that already require IVF patients to sign consent
forms to incorporate such language, as its continued omission
appears to contravene the policy goals of these statutes.
Legislatures could then mandate that only state—or ABA—
approved disposition agreements create a presumption of contractual
enforceability when presented to patients in the manner proscribed
by statute. The combined effect of state-approved agreements and
legislatively-mandated counseling would go a long way toward
making embryo disposition consent forms more effective tools for
expressing parties’ intent and preventing protracted litigation in
embryo disputes.
IV. CONCLUSION
The practice of embryo donation is sufficiently widespread that
state legislatures and high courts have begun to address its legal
implications. Despite their efforts to date, however, embryo transfers
are still fraught with a great deal of uncertainty for all parties
involved. This uncertainty could be greatly reduced if states would
explicitly embrace contract principles as the controlling standards to
govern embryo donations.
While the notion of “embryo adoption” seems to be gaining
popularity, traditional adoption law remains ill-suited for application
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to transactions involving embryos. Because the primary concern of
adoption law is the welfare of a living child, many of its basic tenets
do not make sense in the context of embryo donation. Accordingly,
embryo donation is more properly regulated according to contract
principles, and state legislatures should take measures to ensure that
contract law will function to regulate embryo donations as
predictably as possible.
Even if contract law is fully applicable to embryo transactions,
however, the issue of whether clinical consent forms signed prior to
IVF treatment should be enforced as binding contracts still remains.
In answering this question, important factors to be considered
include the reliance interests of the parties involved, as well as the
degree to which those parties are informed of the potential
consequences of their consent at the time of signing. The ABA’s
Model ART Act presents an ideally balanced approach.
Embryo donation is a promising method of countering
infertility, but the present dearth of settled law governing the practice
leads all too often to bitter disputes between embryo progenitors.
Basic remedies for some of the core problems that complicate this
practice have begun to emerge, however, and if more jurisdictions
actively implement them, the difficulties peculiar to embryo donation
can be reduced, and this form of ART can begin to achieve its full
potential.
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